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Summary
The Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS), established on March 12,
2002, is a color-coded terrorist threat warning system administered by the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS).  The system, which federal departments
and agencies are required to implement and use, provides recommended protective
measures for federal departments and agencies to prevent, prepare for, mitigate
against, and respond to terrorist attacks. 
DHS disseminates HSAS terrorist threat warnings to federal departments, state
and local agencies, the public, and private-sector entities.  This dissemination of
warnings is conducted through multiple communication systems and public
announcements.
HSAS has five threat levels: low, guarded, elevated, high, and severe.  From
March 2002 to the present, the HSAS threat level has been no lower than elevated,
and has been raised to high six times.  The first time it was raised to high was on
September 10, 2002, due to the fear of terrorist attacks on the anniversary of the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.  The most recent time it was raised to high
was on August 1, 2004, due to intelligence regarding possible terrorist attacks on
financial institutions in New York City, Washington, DC, and Newark, New Jersey.
While the need for terrorist threat warnings seems to be widely acknowledged,
there are numerous issues associated with HSAS and its effects on states, localities,
the public, and the private sector.  These issues include the following:
! vagueness of warnings;
! lack of specific protective measures for state and local governments,
the public, and the private sector;
! dissemination of warnings to states, localities, the public, and the
private sector;
! coordination of HSAS with other federal warning systems; and
! cost of threat level changes.
This report will be updated as congressional or executive actions warrant.
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Homeland Security Advisory System:
Possible Issues for Congressional Oversight
On March 12, 2002, Governor Tom Ridge — then Director of the White House
Office of Homeland Security (OHS), and now Secretary of the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) — announced the establishment of the Homeland Security
Advisory System (HSAS).  The HSAS is designed to measure and evaluate terrorist
threats and communicate these threats to federal, state, and local governments, the
public, and the private sector in a timely manner.  Although HSAS is a nationwide
system, it can also be used at a smaller scale to warn of threats against a state, city,
critical infrastructure, or industry.1  From inception to August 2004, the HSAS has
been raised from “elevated” to “high” six times (see Table 2).
The HSAS was developed by OHS using information collected from state and
local first responders, business leaders, and the public.  Following the March 12
announcement, the general public and the private sector were asked to provide
comments on the system, with a deadline for comments on April 26, 2002.2
Within DHS, the Undersecretary for Information Assurance and Infrastructure
Protection — as head of the Information Assurance and Infrastructure Protection
directorate (IAIP) — is responsible for administering the HSAS.  Specifically, IAIP
is responsible for providing, in coordination with other agencies of the federal
government, specific warning information and advice about appropriate protective
measures and countermeasures to state and local government agencies and
authorities, the private sector, other entities, and the public.3
Threat Conditions
The advisory system is based on five threat levels: low, guarded, elevated, high,
and severe.  Each level, with its corresponding identification color, indicates
protective measures mandatory for federal departments and agencies.4
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releases/2002/03/20020312-5.html], visited June 3, 2003.
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Low - Refine preplanned protective measures
- Ensure personnel trained on HSAS and preplanned        
protective measures
- Institutionalize a process for assuring all facilities are      




General - Check emergency response communications
- Review and update emergency response procedures
- Provide information to public that would strengthen its       
  ability to react to an attack
YELLOW
Elevated
Significant - Increase surveillance of critical locations
- Coordinate emergency plans with other federal, state, and  
  local facilities
- Assess the threat and refine protective measures as
necessary
- Implement emergency response plans
ORANGE
High
High - Coordinate security efforts with federal, state, and local      
   law enforcement agencies
- Take additional protective measures at public events,    
changing venues, or consider cancelling if necessary
- Prepare to execute contingency operations
- Restrict facility access to essential personnel
RED
Severe
Severe - Increase or redirect personnel to address critical                 
  emergency needs
- Assign emergency response personnel and mobilize            
   specially trained teams
- Monitor, and redirect transportation systems
- Close public and government facilities
Source: U.S. President (Bush), “Homeland Security Advisory System,” Homeland Security Presidential Directive
3, March 11, 2002.  Available at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/03/20020312-5.html], visited
Jun. 3, 2002.
DHS receives threat information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the National Security Agency (NSA), the
Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), the Department of Defense (DOD), the Terrorist
Threat Integration Center (TTIC), and other agencies.  DHS uses this information to
determine what terrorist threat level to set.5
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Assigning a threat condition involves a variety of considerations, among which
are the following:
! To what degree is the threat information credible?
! To what degree is the threat information corroborated?
! To what degree is the threat specific and imminent?
! How grave are the potential consequences of the threat?6 
The DHS Secretary decides to raise or lower the threat level in consultation with
the Homeland Security Council.7  When the decision to change the threat level is
made, DHS sends an electronic notification to state homeland security centers and
to federal, state, and local agencies via the National Law Enforcement
Telecommunications System (NLETS).8  If circumstances and time permit, the DHS
Secretary or his representative makes an advance conference call to alert governors,
state homeland security advisors, and mayors of selected cities that the terrorism
threat level has been changed and that electronic notification is about to be sent.
Homeland Security Council Membership
Secretary of Homeland Security
Secretary of the Treasury
Secretary of Defense
Attorney General
Secretary of Health and Human Services
Secretary of Transportation
Director of Office Management and Budget
Director of Central Intelligence
Director of Federal Bureau of Investigation
Director of Federal Emergency Management Agency
Chief of Staff to the President
Chief of Staff to the Vice President
Source: Executive Office of the President, “Fact Sheet: Homeland Security Council,” press
release, Oct. 29, 2001.
Following the first conference call and electronic notification via NLETS, DHS
makes a second conference call to as many state and local law enforcement
associations as can be reached.  Following the second conference call, DHS initiates
a secure call using the Business Roundtable’s Critical Emergency Operations
Communications Link (CEO COM LINK) to notify chief executive officers of the
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nation’s top businesses and industries.9  They are asked to dial into a secure
conference call, and after each CEO goes through a multi-step authentication process
to ensure security, DHS or other federal officials brief them on developments and
threats.10
Following the conference call via CEO COM LINK, DHS makes a public
announcement through a press conference.  Finally, critical infrastructure
associations and other business groups are notified.11
Issues
Since the creation of the HSAS, a number of issues have arisen, among which
are: the vagueness of warnings disseminated by the system; the system’s lack of
protective measures recommended for state and local governments, and the public;
the perceived inadequacy of disseminating threats to state and local governments, the
public, and the private sector; and how best to coordinate HSAS with other existing
warning systems.  These issues and pertinent oversight options available to Congress
are discussed below.
Vagueness of Warnings  
The HSAS threat level has been raised six times from “yellow” to “orange”
since its activation on March 12, 2002.  With each change, the Attorney General or
DHS Secretary cited intelligence information but offered little specificity, except on
August 1, 2004, when DHS Secretary Ridge identified financial institutions in New
York, Washington, DC, and New Jersey as being targeted by Al Qaeda.  The only
other time any specifics were given on possible terrorist attack targets was on
February 7, 2003, when DHS Secretary Ridge cited intelligence reports suggesting
Al Qaeda attacks on apartment buildings, hotels, and other soft skin targets.12   But
in this case, no region, state, or city was identified as possible locations of attacks.
Moreover, DHS has never explained the sources and quality of intelligence upon
which the threat levels were based.13
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com/2003], visited May 21, 2003.
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Boston Globe, May 31, 2003, Business section, p. C1.
17 David A. Fahrenthold, “This Time, Orange Alert Seems Less So,” Washington Post, May
22, 2003, p. B2.
18 Ibid.
Analysis and Options.  Some observers have asserted that when federal
government officials announce a new warning about terrorist attacks, the threats are
too vague.14  The vagueness that characterized the six increases in the threat
condition in the past two years has raised concerns that the public may begin to
question the authenticity of the HSAS threat level.  Secretary Ridge told reporters on
June 6, 2003, that DHS is worried about the credibility of the system.  He said that
the system needs to be further refined.15 
Questions about the credibility of the threat, say other observers, might cause
the public to wonder how to act or whether to take any special action at all.  Some
observers maintain that, without specific terrorist threat information, there is no basis
for formulating a clear, easily understood public announcement of what appropriate
protective measures to take.16  Others assert that the continued lack of specific
information arguably can lead to complacency.17
DHS officials cite the lack of specificity in intelligence as the reason for a lack
of detailed information when the threat level is changed.  Secretary Ridge has been
quoted saying that the intelligence gathered so far has been generic; but he
maintained that DHS, and the federal intelligence community that provides
information about terrorist threats will improve. 18 
Option 1: Status Quo.  Congress may view the evolution of the process, and
decisions relating to it are best left to the Department.  The lack of specificity may
be due to the need to protect intelligence sources or a desire by DHS to issue
warnings when threat information is generic, but nonetheless credible.  Maintaining
the status quo places the burden of responding to complaints about the vagueness of
HSAS warnings and the critiques of DHS’s perceived inability to give adequate
terrorist attack warnings on the Department.
Option 2: Provide General Warnings.  Due to the reported  misunderstanding
of HSAS threat levels, and the system’s lack of recommended protective measures
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for state and local agencies, the public, and private-sector entities, Congress could
consider directing DHS to issue general warnings concerning the threat of terrorist
attacks without using the HSAS to notify state and local governments, the public, and
the private sector.  General warnings via public statements, in coordination with
HSAS warnings to the federal government, would ensure that notices of terrorist
threats are issued to state and local governments, the public, and the private sector.
DHS chose to provide general warnings on September 4, 2003, and November 21,
2003.  On September 4, 2003, DHS cited recent federal interagency reviews of
information that raised concerns about possible Al Qaeda plans to attack the U.S. and
U.S. interests overseas.  This general warning listed aviation, critical infrastructure,
WMD, and soft target threats, however, no specifics were given on possible location
or type of attacks.19  Another general warning was issued on November 21, 2003,
when DHS cited a high volume of reports concerning the possible threats against
U.S. interests during the Muslim holiday of Ramadan.  These reports suggested Al
Qaeda remained interested in using commercial aircraft as weapons against critical
infrastructure; however, no location of possible attacks was specified.20  This
approach would address the concerns of some who have asserted that the HSAS
causes misunderstanding at the state and local level, but it would not address the
issue raised by those who say DHS does not give enough specificity in its terrorist
attack warnings.
Option 3: Increase Specificity of Warnings.  Were Congress to decide that
the terrorist warnings issued by DHS are too vague and cause complacency in state
and local agencies, the public, and the private sector, it might instruct DHS to use the
HSAS to provide specific warnings to targeted federal facilities, regions, states,
localities, and private sector industries to the extent that is possible.  DHS has said
that its goal is to have the capability to issue high alerts to designated cities,
geographical regions, industry, or critical infrastructure.21  This approach arguably
would address the concerns about the perceived vagueness of HSAS warnings.  One
could argue that DHS is getting better at providing specificity with the latest alert
issued on August 1, 2004.
Lack of Specific Protective Measures for State and 
Local Governments, the Public, and the Private Sector
The HSAS provides a set of protective measures for each threat condition, but
these protective measures are identified only for federal agencies.  DHS only
recommends protective measures for states, localities, the public, or the private
sector, however, the recommended protective measures are the same ones issued to
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federal agencies.  These recommended protective measures provide no specificity for
states, localities, the public, or the private sector.
Analysis and Options.  HSAS silence with regard to protective measures for
the public, the private sector, and state and local governments has drawn the attention
of some interested observers.  Early on, William B. Berger, President of the
International Association of Chiefs of Police, testified before the Senate
Governmental Affairs Committee that the lack of defined response protocols for state
and local governments was an area of concern among local law enforcement
agencies.22 
Citing what some contend is a lack of DHS guidance on protective measures,
non-federal entities are beginning to fill the perceived void.  For example, the
American Red Cross recommends protective measures for individuals, families,
neighborhoods, schools and businesses at each of the HSAS threat levels.23  Further,
the State of Maryland has adopted the American Red Cross protective measures.24 
Without federal guidance, some cities have adopted the following types of
protective measures when the HSAS threat condition is raised to “orange”:
! Surveillance cameras are activated.
! Law enforcement officers are not granted time off.
! Port security patrols are increased.
! Law enforcement officers are required to carry biological/chemical
protective masks.
! First responders are placed on alert.
! Mass transit authorities broadcast warnings and instructions.
! Mass transit law enforcement officers increase patrols.
! Law enforcement agencies make security checks in sensitive areas,
such as bridges, shopping centers, religious establishments, and
courthouses.25
Option 1: Status Quo.  The HSAS was designed for federal government use
and Congress may deem the system adequate for the federal government.  This
approach can encourage states and localities to conduct threat and vulnerability
assessments that would then assist in the development of specific protective measures
geared to each state and locality’s homeland security needs.  On the other hand, this
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approach might cause confusion among states and localities in their attempts to
prepare for terrorist attacks without federal guidance on protective measures.
Option 2: Federal Guidelines for State and Local Protective Measures.
If Congress decided that there were a need for more guidance for states, localities, the
public, and the private sector, it could either encourage DHS to establish HSAS
protective measure guidance for states, localities, the public, and the private sector,
or it could enact legislation mandating these activities.  These protective measures
could match the federal government preparedness and response activities identified
in the HSAS.  This approach could provide federal government guidance on how to
be prepared for and mitigate against a terrorist attack.  A list of general protective
measures for states, localities, the public, and the private sector may not, however,
be as effective as state and locally devised protective measures.
Communication of Terrorist Threats to State and 
Local Governments, the Public, and the Private Sector
DHS uses a variety of communications systems to provide terrorist threat
warnings to states, localities, the public, and the private sector.  These systems
include, for an example, conference calls, public announcements, CEO COM LINK,
and NLETS, but DHS has no single communication system it uses to issue HSAS
terrorist warnings. 
Analysis and Options.  On April 30, 2003, Jeffery Horvath, chief of the
Dover, Delaware police department told the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee
that his department has never received any official notification of a change of HSAS
threat condition and has relied on the news media for this information.  Michael J.
Chitwood, chief of the Portland, Maine police department reiterated this point, and
specifically identified the Cable News Network (CNN) as the news medium through
which he receives notifications of changes in the HSAS threat level.  He added that
he received official notification from state authorities eight hours later.  Fire chief
Edward P. Plaugher of Arlington County, Virginia, also identified CNN as the
primary source for notification of changes in the HSAS threat level.26  
When testifying before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, DHS
Secretary Ridge said that the process for notifying state, and local agencies and
authorities of a change in the HSAS threat condition needs improvement.27 
The public is alerted to a change in HSAS threat condition through the news
media, following a public announcement from DHS or media leak of the information.
There is no Emergency Alert System (EAS) type communication activated to alert
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the public to a change in threat condition, so the public is not informed of the change
until they monitor a public news source.28
Private sector alerts are through systems like CEO COM LINK and conference
calls.  DHS uses CEO COM LINK to notify private sector entities that participate in
the system, and then makes calls to other critical infrastructure and business
associations. This arguably results in a de facto prioritization of alerted private sector
entities, which could result in a targeted private sector entity being attacked without
a timely and effective alert.
Option 1: Status Quo.  Congress may decide to allow DHS to deal with issues
relating to HSAS advisories at this stage of HSAS development.  This approach
would encourage the continued utilization of the DHS terrorist threat communication
systems.  Since the HSAS is designed for federal government use, there may be no
need for DHS to establish any other communication systems that disseminate
changes in the HSAS terrorist threat levels.  This would, however, not address the
issues some have raised about the dissemination of HSAS advisories. Some would
argue that before DHS establishes a specific system that communicates a change in
HSAS terrorist threat levels, DHS needs to establish protective measures for states,
localities, the public, and the private sector.  This argument is based on the belief that
there is little value in knowing of a change in the HSAS terrorist threat level in the
absence of  recommended protective measures.
Option 2: Revise the HSAS Notification Process.  Congress could
encourage, or enact legislation instructing DHS to revise the HSAS notification
process to ensure that state and local law enforcement, and emergency management
agencies are informed of changes of the terrorist threat level in a more effective and
timely manner.  This approach could address the problem of states and localities
receiving the notification via the news media without first receiving official
notification from DHS. This approach, however, would not address the issue of the
public, and private sectors receiving timely notification of changes in the HSAS
threat level.
A possible communications system DHS could use for disseminating threat
level changes of the HSAS is the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN).
DHS announced an expansion of its HSIN on February 24, 2004.  The HSIN is a
computer-based counterterrorism communications network connecting DHS to all
50 states, five territories, and 50 major urban areas for a two-way flow of terrorist
threat information.  This communications system delivers real-time interactive
connectivity among state and local partners with the DHS Homeland Security
Operations Center (HSOC) through the Joint Regional Information Exchange System
(JRIES). The community of users include State Homeland Security Advisors, State
Adjutant Generals, State Emergency Operation Centers, and local emergency
response providers.29  
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Cities,” press release, Feb. 24, 2004.  Available at [http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display
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32 Federal Emergency Managers Information System (FEMIS).
33 Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS).
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Coordination of HSAS with Other Warning Systems
HSAS is not the only federal warning system; eight separate systems exist to
provide timely notification about imminent and potentially catastrophic threats to
health and safety.30  The types of hazards covered by these systems include severe
weather,31 contamination from chemical and biological weapon stockpiles scheduled
for destruction,32 terrorist attacks,33 and any other emergency or hazard the President
decides is significant enough to warrant public notification.34  
Analysis and Options.  Some argue for the consolidation of the existing
warning systems into one “all-hazard” system.  The Partnership for Public Warning
is one organization advocating this type of consolidation.35 Other organizations, such
as the Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) Media Security and Reliability
Council (MSRC) have recommended that the Emergency Alert System (EAS) should
be established and implemented uniformly in all parts of the United States.36  This
enhanced EAS would be fed information from systems such as the HSAS.
Consolidation and coordination of these warning systems would present
challenges to administering an “all-hazard” warning system. Some of the challenges
include the  administration of the warning system, interoperability of existing
warning systems, and the involvement of industry.
Congress has directed the President to insure that all appropriate federal
agencies are prepared to issue warnings of potential disasters to state and local
officials, and that federal agencies provide technical assistance to state and local
governments to insure that timely and effective disaster warnings are provided. The
President is authorized to utilize or make available to federal, state, and local
agencies the facilities of the civil defense communications system, or any other
federal communications system, for the purpose of providing warnings to
governmental authorities and the civilian population in areas endangered by
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disasters.37 Federal agencies that currently administer warning systems include
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Federal Communications
Commission, Federal Emergency Management Agency, and Department of Defense.
DHS is also responsible for coordinating and distributing warnings to the public.38
Existing warning systems are not interoperable. Reasons for this are: 
! separate transmitting and receiving equipment;39
! separate standard message protocols;
! separate procedures for how warnings are input into dissemination
systems; and
! separate training, exercising, and testing of the system.40
Since this technology is primarily researched, developed, and operated by
private industry, the federal government could establish a relationship with the
corporate suppliers of these technologies, a relationship to encourage  development
and effectively consolidate or provide the means to make the current warning systems
interoperable.  
Consolidating and coordinating federal warning systems, however, may cause
a loss of concentration on the systems’ traditional hazards.  Mature warning systems
have established alerting protocols and routines that, if consolidated, could become
too broad, which may result in less effective warnings.
Option 1: Status Quo.  Without congressional intervention, federal agencies
responsible for issuing warnings will likely continue to narrowly focus on  traditional
hazards.  This approach allows mature warning systems to continue communicating
alerts and protective measures to an identified audience.  Also, this approach would
not incur an increased need for federal funding that would be required to update, test,
and ensure compatibility of the systems.  On the other hand, this approach would not
address issues such as overlap of hazards (terrorist threat warnings of HSAS, and any
presidential declared emergency warning issued by EAS), and the potential need to
reach a wide audience through the use of multiple warning systems.
Option 2: Coordination and Update of Warning Systems.  If Congress
decided to address the issue of coordinating warning systems, it could require all
federal agencies with hazard warning responsibilities, to establish, and develop a
means for coordinating and updating existing warning systems.  This approach could
allow any warning of man-made or natural hazards to be issued on the full range of
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federal warning systems.  This could ensure that a larger number of the state and
local governments, the public, and private sector entities would receive the specific
warning in an effective and timely manner.  It would require a communication
protocol to be developed that allowed one federal warning system to “talk” to a
different system.
Updating of warning systems would not only include the ability of one system
to “talk” to another, but could also include the ability of such systems as EAS to be
transmitted on off-the-shelf telecommunication devices such as cellular phones.
Given the widespread use of wireless communications, some observers have argued
for warnings to be issued on wireless devices.41  In the 108th Congress, S. 564
proposes such an approach that would facilitate the deployment of wireless networks
in order to extend the range and reach of EAS.  It would also ensure emergency
personnel priority access to communications facilities in times of emergency.42
Option 3: Consolidation of Warning Systems.  If Congress decided that
there needs to be an all-hazard warning system, it could enact legislation requiring
the federal agencies that have warning responsibilities to develop and implement
such a system to warn states, localities, the public, and the private sector.  This
approach could ensure that any warning of a hazard — man-made or natural —
would be disseminated to as many entities as necessary in a timely and effective
manner.  In the 108th Congress, two bills, S. 118, and H.R. 2537, propose such an
approach to all-hazard warnings.  The bills propose the establishment of a single all-
hazard warning system that would ensure that states, localities, the public, and the
private sector would be alerted to specific risks from man-made, and natural
hazards.43 This approach, however, would arguably require federal funding and effort
to research, test, develop, and implement an all-hazard warning system.
Cost of Threat Level Changes
An increase in the HSAS threat level imposes both direct and indirect costs on
federal, state, and local governments, the private sector, and the public.  These costs
include the increased security measures undertaken by states and localities, loss to
tourism, and the indirect cost on the economy during a period of heightened threat
level.  In FY2003, the Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP) Critical
Infrastructure Protection grant program authorized state and local governments to use
allocated grants to fund overtime costs associated with heightened threat levels.44
According to ODP’s FY2004 State Homeland Security Grant and Urban Area
Security Initiative grant programs guidance, overtime is an authorized expenditure
only associated with training or exercises.  ODP’s Law Enforcement Terrorism
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Prevention program, however, does allow overtime costs specifically related to
homeland security efforts.45
Analysis and Options.  Local governments incur direct costs when they put
in place additional security measures to deal with a higher threat condition.46  An
example of this is the cost of random car searches at Atlanta’s Hartsfield airport,
which reportedly requires $180,000 a month for labor and signage.  This cost is borne
by Atlanta’s police department and airport administration.47  Because of the budget
crisis that many states are experiencing, additional homeland security costs during
heightened threat periods are seen as an additional fiscal burden. The costs associated
with threat level changes have prompted many state and local officials to complain
to DHS.48   The United States Conference of Mayors released a 145-city survey that
reported that during periods of heightened alert homeland security costs increased to
additional $70 million a week.49 
This increase in homeland security costs during heightened threat periods also
has localities arguing for direct funding from the federal government.  FEMA’s
Assistance to Firefighters  and ODP’s Urban Area Security Initiative grant programs
are the only assistance that provide 100% of the funding to localities.  ODP’s Urban
Area Security Initiative grants, however, first pass through the state, which causes
some localities to complain about a delay in receiving funding.
Authorized program expenditures are another point of contention that states and
localities have with homeland security funding and costs.  All homeland security
grant programs list authorized equipment and activities that grant allocations can be
used to fund.  States and localities may argue that these authorized expenditures do
not address their specific homeland security needs.
These direct homeland security costs occur not only at the state and local level:
when the threat level changes, federal departments and agencies have to adopt
prescribed protective measures outlined in the different threat condition levels of the
HSAS. 
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An indirect cost of a heightened threat level is the negative effect on tourism in
cities perceived as potential targets of terrorism .  It has been observed that increased
threat levels and the need for heightened security have hurt the tourism industry of
such metropolitan areas as Washington, DC, New York, and Chicago.  Washington’s
Mayor Anthony Williams urged residents to be alert for suspicious activities. He also
wanted the city to  remain friendly, open, and safe to minimize the affects of the
terrorist threat level on tourism.50  D.C. Delegate Eleanor Holmes Norton agreed with
the need to keep Washington open to tourism.  She said that the city’s tourism
industry had been hurt by changes in threat condition, and that she feared some
officials would overreact and shut down public buildings.51  An example of the
impact on tourism is the decision by some schools to cancel trips to Washington
because of the threat of terrorist attack.52
Some municipal officials have had to make a costly decision between homeland
security and tourism.  Philadelphia’s mayor, John F. Street, for instance, chose not
to close down a street around Independence Hall after he received a call from DHS
Secretary Ridge, who advised its closing.  Mayor Street cited traffic and tourism
concerns as the reason he chose not to respond to the recommendation.53  Another
indirect cost may be how a change in the HSAS threat condition affects the stock
markets.54
Option 1: Status Quo.   Congress may decide that the ODP grant programs
adequately meet the needs of states and localities’ homeland security costs due to a
heightened HSAS threat.  It may be an appropriate approach for ensuring the splitting
of homeland security costs among the several tiers of government.  This policy
approach would not however, address such issues as the needs of some state and
local first responder agencies, of hiring additional personnel, the loss of revenue
generated by tourism due to an increased terrorist threat level, or the cost the
economy incurs when the terrorist threat level is raised.
Option 2: Funding Through Established ODP Grant Programs.  Should
Congress decide that more funding needs to be provided to cover costs incurred by
states and localities due to an increased terrorist threat level, it could consider
establishing grant programs that specifically fund such terrorist prevention,
preparedness, and mitigation activities  as overtime pay for first responders and the
purchase of equipment and personnel for the protection of critical infrastructure.  In
the 108th Congress, S. 1245 proposes such an approach by recommending that a
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consolidated homeland security grant program provide grant allocations for overtime
expenses related to training, activities (as determined by the DHS Secretary) relating
to an increase in the HSAS threat level, and emergency preparedness responses to a
WMD incident.55 
Option 3: Funding Specifically for Heightened Threat Levels.  Should
Congress decide to provide funding for costs incurred during heightened threat level
periods, it could appropriate funds, in addition to ODP homeland security grant
programs, specifically to states, localities, and private sector entities to compensate
for costs associated with a change in the HSAS threat level.  In the 108th Congress,
S. 728 proposes such an approach by compensating state and local law enforcement
for costs associated with airport security.56
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Table 2. Homeland Security Advisory Threat Level Changes




“Orange” Days Reason for Threat Level Change to “Orange” 
Elevated
(Yellow)




Sep. 11, 2002 - Sep. 24, 2002 13
Terrorist threat information based on debriefings of a senior Al Qaeda operative.a
Elevated
(Yellow)




Feb. 7, 2003 - Feb. 27, 2003 20
Intelligence reports suggesting Al Qaeda attacks on apartment buildings, hotels,
and other soft skin targets.b
Elevated
(Yellow)




Mar. 17, 2003 - Apr. 11, 2003
25
Intelligence reports indicated Al Qaeda would probably attempt to launch terrorist
attacks against U.S. interests to defend Muslims and the “Iraqi people.”c
Elevated
(Yellow)




May 20, 2003 - May 30, 2003
10
In the wake of terrorist bombings in Saudi Arabia and Morocco, the U.S.
intelligence community believed Al Qaeda had entered an operational period
worldwide, including attacks in the United States.d
Elevated
(Yellow)




Dec. 21, 2003 - Jan. 9, 2004 19
Increased terrorist communications indicating attacks.e
Elevated
(Yellow)




Aug. 1, 2004 - Nov. 10, 2004 98
Terrorist threat intelligence indicates that Al Qaeda has been planning attacks




Nov. 11, 2004- Present  — 
 — 
Total Number of “Orange” Days 184
CRS-17
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Press Secretary.
a. U.S. Department of Homeland Secretary, Office of the Press Secretary, “Director Ridge, Attorney General Ashcroft Discuss Threat Level,” press release,
Sept. 10, 2002.  Available at [http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=150], visited Mar. 4, 2004.
b. Ibid., “Threat Level Raised to Orange,” press release, Feb. 7, 2003.  Available at [http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=459], visited Mar. 4,
2004.
c. Ibid., “Operation Liberty Shield: Statement by Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge,” press release, Mar. 17, 2003.  Available at
[http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=519].
d. Ibid., “Statement of Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge Raising the Threat Level,” press release, May 20, 2003.  Available at [http://www.
dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=741], visited Mar. 4, 2004.
e. CRS could find no DHS press release providing the reason for raising the threat level from “yellow” to “orange” on Dec. 20, 2003.  Other news media
sources cite the reason as “increased terrorist communications in recent days”; see Frank James, “U.S. Raises Terror Alert,” Chicago Tribune, Dec.
22, 2003, p. 1. 
f. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Press Secretary, “Remarks by Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge Regarding Recent Threat
Reports,” press release, Aug. 1, 2004.  Available at [http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=3870], visited Aug. 5, 2004.
